PROSPERITY
A Gold-Copper Project of Taseko Mines Limited

Taseko Prosperity Gold-Copper Project

Appendix 2-6-C

Taseko Mines Limited

TASEKO MINES LIMITED
PROSPERITY PROJECT

PROJECT RISK ASSESSMENT
(REF. NO. 10173/13-2)

NOVEMBER 30, 1998

TASEKO MINES LIMITED
PROSPERITY PROJECT

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TASEKO MINES LIMITED
PROSPERITY PROJECT

PROJECT RISK ASSESSMENT

PART OF A MULTIPLE ACCOUNTS EVALUATION FOR SELECTION OF A PREFERRED MINE DEVELOPMENT PLAN (REF. NO. 10173/13-2)

TABLE OF CONTENTS

SECTION 1.0	PURPOSE		1
SECTION 2.0	SCOPE OF STUDY	3	
	2.1	PROJECT COMPONENTS AND POTENTIAL FAILURE MODES	3
	2.2	BASE CASE SELECTION	4
SECTION 3.0	RISK ASSESSMENT PROCESS		5
	3.1	RISK: LIKELIHOOD AND CONSEQUENCE	5
	3.2	CONSEQUENCE CATEGORIES	6
	3.3	BASE CASE ASSESSMENT	6
	3.4	RELATIVE ASSESSMENTS	7
	3.5	ABSOLUTE ASSESSMENT	8
	3.6	COMPARISON OF MINE DEVELOPMENT PLANS	8
SECTION 4.0	POTENTIAL FAILURE MODES		9
	4.1	OPEN PIT 9	
	4.2	TAILINGS STORAGE FACILITY (TSF)	11
	4.3	WASTE ROCK STORAGE AREAS (WRSA)	15
	4.4	FISHERIES COMPENSATION FACILITIES	17
	4.5	WATER AND TAILINGS MANAGEMENT/ DISTRIBUTION	19
	4.6	MILL SITE	21

TABLES

Table 1a	Subjective Ranking Scheme (Absolute)
Table 1b	Subjective Ranking Scheme (Relative)
Table 2	Comparative Colour Coding
Table 3	Option III - Subjective Likelihood and Consequence Ratings (Absolute Rating)
Table 4	Option I - Subjective Likelihood and Consequence Ratings (Relative to Option III)
Table 5	Option II - Subjective Likelihood and Consequence Ratings (Relative to Option III)
Table 6	Option IV - Subjective Likelihood and Consequence Ratings (Relative to Option III)
Table 7	Option V - Subjective Likelihood and Consequence Ratings (Relative to Option III)
Table 8	Option I - Subjective Likelihood and Consequence Ratings (Absolute Rating)
Table 9	Option II - Subjective Likelihood and Consequence Ratings (Absolute Rating)
Table 10	Option IV - Subjective Likelihood and Consequence Ratings (Absolute Rating)
Table 11	Option V - Subjective Likelihood and Consequence Ratings (Absolute Rating)
Table 12	Comparative Subjective Summary (All Options with Absolute Rating)
Table 13	Summary of Absolute Ratings by Consequence Type and by Mine Component (A+ to B- Scale)

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PROSPERITY PROJECT

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SECTION 1.0 - PURPOSE

The purpose of this preliminary and subjective risk assessment is to serve as one component, or account, of a larger, comprehensive Multiple Accounts Evaluation (MAE) of the Prosperity Project. The MAE is intended to assist Taseko Mines Limited in the selection of a single, preferred Mine Development Plan from five options. Other accounts of the MAE include project viability, environmental and socio-economic issues and First Nations. Upon selection, the preferred Mine Development Plan will be combined with the proposed transmission line and road access to form the Proposed Project Development Plan (PPDP). This PPDP will be subjected to a full environmental assessment based on instructions provided by the BC Environmental Assessment Office. The resulting project report, which will partially recount the MAE selection process, will be prepared for submission to the harmonized environmental assessment process.

Serving to assist in the selection of a preferred mine development option amongst five, the following study is intended to demonstrate the relative technical merits or disadvantages between the five options in terms of potential risks. As such, this assessment should not be interpreted to be an absolute, or quantitative assessment of the risks associated with each option and project component.

The objective of this project risk assessment is to provide a rational basis for comparison of the five mine development options in terms of likelihood of occurrence of potential failure modes and their consequences on Human Life, Water Quality, Fisheries, Wildlife/Biophysical and Operations (termed 'Consequence Categories'). The process adopted to meet this objective is as follows:

1. Baseline, *absolute* and subjective risk assessment of a Baseline Option (selected as Option III Mine Development Plan), followed by;

2. rating of likelihoods and consequences of the potential failure modes associated with the Comparison Options (Options I, II, IV and V) *relative* to the Baseline Option, followed by;

3. determination of *absolute* likelihoods and consequences associated with the Comparison Options by comparison of their relative ratings to the absolute ratings of the Baseline Option, and concluded by;

4. colour and grading summaries of the absolute risks associated with the Baseline and Comparison Options i) by Consequence Category and ii) by Mine Component.

SECTION 2.0 - SCOPE OF STUDY

2.1 PROJECT COMPONENTS AND POTENTIAL FAILURE MODES

This comparative risk assessment has been limited primarily to the technical constraints or potential failure modes associated with the five previously selected Mine Development Plans. The assessment is further limited to the following project components, omitting the transportation and transmission line corridors and their associated risks:

- Open Pit
- Tailings Storage Facility (TSF)
- Waste Rock Storage Areas (WRSA)
- Fisheries Compensation Facilities
- Water and Tailings Management and Distribution
- Mill Site

Each of the above project components have been further sub-divided into 39 separate failure modes. This sub-division serves to itemize and record specific differences between Mine Development Plans and to force the independent and consistent treatment of failure mechanisms and resources at risk.

At this preliminary stage, each failure mode is considered an independent event, unrelated to the occurrence of any other failure mode and the potential for two or more magnifying or interfering consequences. Similarly, failure modes that are conditional upon the simultaneous occurrence of two or more other modes are not considered. Inclusion of these conditional modes would require a more rigorous assessment that is warranted only at a later stage in the project review, following the selection and further study of a PPDP.

2.2 BASE CASE SELECTION

The Option III MDP has been arbitrarily selected as the base case for which an absolute, subjective risk assessment has been completed, and against which the relative risk assessments of Options I, II, IV and V are compared.

For all options, the risk assessments consider only those consequences resulting from each of the failure modes described below. The consequences of the known, or definite, impacts of each option are not considered relevant to this risk assessment, and are more appropriately discussed as part of an Environmental Impact Assessment. Given this approach, the consequences of a certain failure mode consider only those resources (e.g. fisheries, wildlife, water, etc.) that remain after construction of the given MDP, not the existing, pre-construction resources.

For example, the consequences of an open pit failure on the fisheries resources surrounding the Option III MDP should include impacts on the Taseko River, the lower reaches of Fish Creek and the surrounding fisheries compensation structures only, excluding Fish Lake itself. Loss of the Fish Lake habitat associated with the Option III MDP is acknowledged and will be addressed in an Environmental Impact Assessment of the mine development options. In contrast, the consequences of an open pit failure on the fisheries resources surrounding the Option I MDP would be more significant than those of Option III as the adjacent Fish Lake habitat would be maintained during operations and would likely be negatively impacted by open pit failure.

SECTION 3.0 - RISK ASSESSMENT PROCESS

3.1 RISK: LIKELIHOOD AND CONSEQUENCE

In a risk assessment, the risk associated with each failure mode is considered to arise as a result of two sufficient and necessary components: likelihood and consequence. A life, resource or operation may only be considered to be at risk if both the potential (likelihood) for a failure *and* a consequence of that failure exist. Risk may be increased due either to an increased likelihood of occurrence and/or an increased consequence of occurrence. Similarly, all other factors equal, one option may be said to be riskier than another if the likelihood *or* consequences of a failure are greater than those associated with the other option.

Recognizing these two components of risk, the likelihood and consequences of occurrence of each failure mode, of each project component have been qualitatively and independently estimated and combined to determine a matrix of risk ratings for later comparison of the mine development options.

Consequence ratings for all failure modes and for each of the five mine development plans were determined by consensus during meetings, telephone conversations and other communications between:

- Columbia Pacific Consulting Ltd.
- Knight Piésold Ltd.
- Triton Environmental Consultants Ltd.
- Watermark Consulting Ltd.
- Sustainable Resource Development Ltd.

All likelihood ratings have been estimated by Knight Piésold Ltd., assuming a consistent level of risk management and design across all five options.

3.2 CONSEQUENCE CATEGORIES

The consequences of occurrence of all failure modes have been separated into five broad categories:

Human Life

- Water Quality
- Fisheries
- Wildlife / Biophysical
- Operations

These consequence categories are intended to distinguish between the risks imposed on Water Quality, for example, versus Mine Operations. No attempt has been made to weight or rank the consequence categories. An effort has been made to consider potential consequences during both mine operations and post-closure. The Human Life category refers to the incremental consequences of occurrence of a failure mode on members of the public and mine operators alike. Water Quality refers to the joint resources of groundwater and surface waters in terms of short and long-term water chemistry, quantity, variability and clarity/turbidity. Fisheries and wildlife consequences include impacts to any fish habitat, including the fish compensation structures, or wildlife that are present at the time of failure (during mine operations or after closure). Operational consequences consider the need to replace machinery, double handle overburden, waste rock or ore, re-contour tailings or waste rock surfaces, temporarily pump and/or store excess fresh water or reclaim water, or in the extreme, temporarily or permanently shut down the mill process.

3.3 BASE CASE ASSESSMENT

Having selected the Option III MDP as the base case, an absolute, or base case, assessment was completed according to the subjective ranking scheme detailed in Table 1a. Knight Piésold has assigned likelihood ratings of '1' (corresponding to 'Extremely Low Likelihood') through '5' (corresponding to 'Extremely High Likelihood') to each of the base case failure modes as shown in the second column of Table 3. The remaining columns of Table 3 reflect the absolute, or base case, consequence ratings associated with each failure mode, following the consequence ranking scheme ('A' to 'E') of Table 1a.

3.4 RELATIVE ASSESSMENTS

In order to allow for a comparison of the five mine development plans, the remaining four Options (Options I, II, IV and V) have received likelihood and consequence

ratings according to the subjective ranking scheme of Table 1b. This ranking scheme of 'i' to 'v' for likelihood and 'a' to 'e' for consequence is intended to be relative to the absolute likelihood and consequence scheme used to assess the Option III MDP.

According to the relative ranking scheme of Table 1b, likelihood and consequence codes 'a' or 'b' and 'i' or 'ii' refer to expected likelihood and consequences of a given failure mode that are 'Less Likely' or 'Slightly Less Likely' and 'Less Significant' or 'Slightly Less Significant', respectively, than the those of the same failure mode for the Option III MDP. Similarly, likelihood and consequence codes of 'd' or 'e' and 'iv' or 'v' refer to expected likelihood and consequences that are 'Slightly More Likely' or 'More Likely' and 'Slightly More Significant' or 'More Significant' than those for the Option III MDP. Relative codes of 'iii' and 'c' indicate likelihood and consequences that are 'Similar' to the Option III MDP.

For example, if a given failure mode was assessed to have a 'High' likelihood of occurrence (code '4') for the Option III MDP, and the same failure mode was assessed to have a 'Similar Likelihood to Option III' for the Option I MDP, the relative code entered for the likelihood of that failure mode would be a 'iii' in the table corresponding to the Option I MDP (Table 4).

The results of this relative, subjective ranking of likelihood and consequences for the Option I, II, IV and V mine development plans are presented in Tables 4 through 7, respectively.

3.5 ABSOLUTE ASSESSMENT

In addition to the relative assessments described above, whereby Options I, II, IV and V are compared to a base case subjective assessment of Option III, absolute risk assessments of the four Comparison Options (I, II, IV and V) have also been determined. Tables 3, 8, 9, 10 and 11 provide absolute assessments of likelihood and consequences for each of the five options respectively. The absolute values entered in Tables 8 through 11 (Options I, II, IV and V) have been determined from the Option III absolute ratings, adjusted upwards or downwards according to the relative ratings provided in Tables 4, 5, 6 and 7. As an example, consider an absolute rating associated with Option III of '2-B'. If the corresponding *relative* rating associated with one of the Comparison Options was 'iv-b', then the resulting *absolute* rating assigned to the Comparison Option (in Table 8, 9, 10 or 11) would be '3-A'.

3.6 COMPARISON OF MINE DEVELOPMENT PLANS

As discussed, risk is commonly treated as the product, or combination, of likelihood and consequence for a potential failure mode. In this case, and for the purposes of comparison, an absolute risk to each consequence category and for each failure mode has been determined through the assessment of likelihood and consequences for the Option I, II, IV and V mine development plans relative to the Option III MDP. These combined risks have been colour coded according to Table 2, and summarized for comparison of all five options in Table 12.

As indicated in Table 2, increasing shades of blue suggest an increasing risk to the given consequence category for a specific failure mode. Similarly, increasing shades of green suggest a decreasing relative risk. The solid yellow shading corresponding to a risk code of '1-E' (Table 2) indicates a failure mode and consequence category for which the consequence is estimated to be 'Extremely High' but the likelihood is 'Extremely Low', resulting in a relative risk rating that is intermediate to the blue and green shading, but difficult to use at this level of study. The same applies for a risk code of '5-A', suggesting an 'Extremely Low' consequence event with an 'Extremely High' likelihood of occurrence.

SECTION 4.0 – POTENTIAL FAILURE MODES

4.1 OPEN PIT

The open pit project component has been divided into eight failure modes. Four of these failure modes consider the likelihood and consequences of slope instability, while the other four modes consider potential seepage and dewatering issues related to the pit development. Large south and east pit wall failure modes (Items 1.1 and 1.2) are separated from large pit wall failures on the other sides of the pit. The reasons for this distinction are related to the presence of Fish Lake, due south of the open pit, and the Mill Site, to the East. Large pit wall failure modes on these two sides of the pit could significantly impact Fish Lake, Plant Site infrastructure (i.e. the crusher facility), and ramping into and out of the pit.

A brief description of each failure mode related to the open pit is presented below.

Large South Pit Wall Failure

The likelihood of a large South Pit Wall failure is considered low for all options. The consequences of a large failure of the South Pit Wall would however, in consideration of Options I, II, IV and V, result in significant impacts to Fish Lake, the water diversion channels around the pit, site infrastructure and pit access ramps. For Options II and IV a failure of this mode would also impact on the dam structure separating the pit from Fish Lake. For Option III, a large South Pit Wall failure would result in significant impacts to the stability of the waste rock facility, drainage sumps and pit access ramps.

Large East Pit Wall Failure

The likelihood of a Large East Pit Wall Failure is considered low for all options. A large failure of the East Pit wall would impact on the crusher facility, the mill site infrastructure and the pit access ramps of all options.

Large Other Pit Wall Failure

A large failure of other pit walls would affect primarily the water diversion structures around the pit, with the exception Option III, and the mining operations within the pit. A failure of this type could include impacts on water diversion structures, pit ramps, mining equipment used in the pit and various in-pit infrastructure items such as drainage sumps and pumps.

Excessive Seepage from Fish Lake

In consideration of Options I, II, IV and V, excessive seepage from Fish Lake into the open pit could result in the increased likelihood of a South Pit wall failure. Excessive seepage of water into the pit would also cause operational difficulties in containing and pumping the water to minimize the affects on mining operations. Option III would not face the same risk of seepage from Fish Lake due to the project configuration.

Excessive Seepage from Deep Aquifer

The likelihood of excessive seepage from a deep aquifer is considered low for Option III, Option I and Option V. The probability of excessive seepage increases however with Options II and IV due to the depth of the pit and the flatter slopes at the south end of the pits where the deep aquifer is situated. That is, because Options II and IV maintain Fish Lake by the construction of a coffer dam at the northwest end of the lake the factors of safety applied to the design of the pit walls becomes higher in the south end of the pit resulting in flatter slopes of the pit walls. The consequence of excessive seepage into the pit from a deep aquifer relates primarily to operational difficulties with handling and pumping the excess water.

Inter-ramp Pit Wall Failure (localized)

The likelihood of an inter-ramp pit wall failure is high for all options but the consequences are considered low relating primarily to the potential for a relatively brief interruption of mining operations in the pit. Options II and IV have reduced likelihoods of inter-ramp failure due to their flatter slopes (civil, rather than mining criteria) relative to the other options.

Vertical Depressurization Pump Failure

There is a moderate probability of a failure of the vertical depressurization pumps for all options. Should a failure occur, it would result in the collection of seepage water along the south wall of the bottom of the pit which could cause the in-pit sumps to overflow potentially affecting mining operations within the pit. As well, a source of drinking water to the Plant Site would be interrupted.

Pit Sump Pump (and back-up) Failure

Failure of the pit sump pump could cause minor interruptions to in-pit mining operations while new pumps are delivered and installed. The likelihood of this type of failure occurring is considered moderate for Options II, III and IV and slightly less likely for Options I and V due to the smaller pit areas and volumes associated with Options I and V, resulting in less water having to be pumped from the pit.

4.2 TAILINGS STORAGE FACILITY (TSF)

The tailings storage facility component has been divided into eleven potential failure modes. Three of these consider the likelihood and consequences of excessive seepage from the facility through main or saddle embankments or through the foundations. A fourth mode considers the likelihood and consequences of internal erosion, i.e. piping. The remaining seven modes consider overtopping of embankments, embankment instability, excessive sedimentation during construction and operations, the release of Acid Rock Drainage (ARD) (in the event of it's occurrence) outside of the tailings facility and the likelihood and consequences of insufficient submergence of potentially acid generating waste rock. The first six of these potential failure modes are related to the integrity of the tailings storage facility while the other five are related more to the construction and ongoing operation of the facility.

A brief description of each failure mode related to the tailings storage facility is presented below.

Excessive Seepage Through Embankment

Excessive seepage through the embankment would be the result of a failure of the internal drainage systems that are designed to lower the phreatic (water) surface within the embankment and collect all such drainage for recycle to the supernatant pond. Seepage that is not intercepted by the internal drains and seepage collection system would be introduced to the downstream environment. If acid rock drainage was to develop within the tailings storage facility due to insufficient submergence of the PAG waste rock, this seepage could be of poor quality and result in an impact on the surrounding water quality, fisheries and wildlife / biophysical environment. The likelihood of seepage through the embankment is related most closely to the height of the embankment, and the plan area of the facility. Smaller facility areas tend to be more difficult to manage pond location and proximity of the pond to the embankment crest. This is significant due to the increased potential for seepage through embankments when a supernatant pond is in direct contact with embankment materials.

Excessive Seepage Through Foundations

Similar to seepage through the embankment, seepage through foundations could have a significant consequence if the seepage was of low pH and/or high metal concentrations due to acid rock drainage within the facility. The likelihood of seepage through the foundations is related primarily to the overburden and bedrock characteristics and to the drainage features within the embankment. The consequences of foundation seepage depend upon the water quality and the sensitivity of the watersheds that would be affected.

Internal Erosion (piping)

Internal erosion is carefully prevented through the use of properly graded filters within the embankment cross section. Failure of centreline embankments due to internal erosion is extremely rare, but the consequences of such failures are potentially catastrophic to the surrounding environment.

Overtopping of Embankment (spillway failure)

The likelihood of overtopping of the tailings embankment due to a spillway failure is extremely low for all options, however the consequence of this event is moderate to high with the largest impact being on operations. A spillway failure would significantly impact the operation of the tailings facility and, as a result, the operation of the mill. Impacts to water quality and fisheries, particularly for Options I and II on the Tete Angela system and Options IV and V on Fish Lake, are significant as a result of the potential for increased sedimentation in the receiving waters.

Embankment Instability

Embankment instability is unlikely due to the use of appropriate engineering design parameters and safeguards. However, in a comparison, Options I, II, IV and V have a greater likelihood of failure due to the arrangement of the various mine components relative to the arrangement of Option III. Specifically, the waste rock storage location associated with Option III forms a stabilizing buttress for the embankment, eliminating the potential for a large scale embankment failure with Option III. Additionally, the embankment associated with Option III is centred at a natural depression, further promoting stability and dramatically limiting the potential travel distance of tailings resulting from a failure. The consequences of embankment instability are moderate to extremely high with the largest potential impact being to operations. The failure of a tailings embankment would significantly impact the continued operation of the facility and, as a result, the operation of the mill. Impacts to water quality and fisheries, particularly for Options I, II, IV and V, are significant as a result of the potential for tailings material being deposited within local stream channels and Fish Lake, and subsequent ARD contamination.

Insufficient PAG Waste Rock Submergence

Insufficient submergence of potentially acid generating (PAG) waste rock could result in the oxidation of this material and the generation of acid rock drainage (ARD) within the TSF. ARD within the TSF would result in the deterioration of supernatant water quality and potential impacts to receiving waters and fish habitat in the event of a release from the TSF. The quality of make-up water to the mill could also be affected due to low pH values, resulting in a potential impact to the mill operations and equipment. Options I and V have a slightly greater probability of insufficient PAG waste rock submergence due to their being smaller facilities with reduced supernatant ponds and a more constricted operational scheme.

Seepage Collection/Recycle System Failure

Failure of the seepage collection and recycle system could result in the uncontrolled discharge of untreated waste waters into the environment. In the case of Options I, II, IV and V this could result in a significant impact to the water quality and fisheries of Fish Lake and local tributaries feeding into Fish Lake. Moderate impacts could also be expected for all options on operations and wildlife/biophysical components.

Excessive Sedimentation During Construction

Excessive sedimentation during construction would result from the failure of sediment control structures around the site due to high precipitation events causing sediment to be washed into receiving waters such as Fish Creek and/or Fish Lake. In the case of Option III, the likelihood of this sediment being transported into the receiving waters is less due to the proximity of the TSF to the open pit and the direction of drainage into the pit and away from the areas of potential concern. The consequence of excessive sedimentation relates primarily to impacts to the water quality and fisheries of the receiving waters, especially Fish Lake, and is therefore more of a concern for Options I, II, IV and V.

Excessive Sedimentation During Operations

Excessive sedimentation from the tailings storage facility during operations due to the failure of sediment control structures and/or seepage collection ditches has an extremely low likelihood of occurrence. This low likelihood of occurrence is primarily due to the excess capacity of the tailings storage facility to retain water during high precipitation events allowing adequate settling time prior to discharge from the facility. Options I, II, IV and V show a higher probability for excessive sedimentation during operations because of their relative locations within their catchments as compared to Option III, i.e. all runoff from Option III would end up in the open pit. As is the case with construction, the primary consequence of excessive sedimentation during operations relates to the potential impacts to water quality and fish habitat within the receiving waters, especially Fish lake.

Release of ARD from PAG - Outside the Tailings Storage Facility

The release of ARD from potentially acid generating waste rock outside of the tailings facility has an extremely low likelihood of occurrence for Option III due to the fact that downstream of the TSF is the waste rock storage area and the open pit. For Options I, II, IV and V the likelihood of occurrence increases due to the location of the facilities and the presence of downstream receptors. The consequence of a failure of this type is low for Option III and moderate for all other options.

4.3 WASTE ROCK STORAGE AREAS (WRSA)

The waste rock storage area component has been divided into five failure modes. The first mode deals with the likelihood and consequence of instability within the waste dump, another two modes consider the potential for acid rock drainage (ARD) from potentially acid generating (PAG) waste rock inside, due to improper sorting, and outside the WRSA and the final two modes consider the potential for excessive sedimentation during construction and operations.

A brief description of each failure mode related to the waste rock storage areas are presented below.

Instability

Instability of the waste rock storage areas could result in a significant failure of the waste dumps. A failure of this nature would have significant localized impacts on the surrounding area due to the destructive movement of material down slope. Option III is shown to have a low probability of instability due to the stable location of the waste rock facilities within the Fish Lake basin. The other options are all located on slopes and/or are placed higher in their catchment areas which increase the probability of instability over the life of the facility.

Improper Sorting In-Pit (PAG to WRSA)

Improper sorting of potentially acid generating waste rock in the pit and the transfer of that PAG material to the WRSA, has a moderate probability of occurrence for all options. The impact of this occurrence relates primarily to the potential for this material to generate acid without being covered or buffered by non-acid generating, or acid consuming, material. The consequences of improper sorting are slightly higher for Options I, II, IV and V due to the presence of the Lower Fish Creek and Taseko River systems nearby.

Excessive Sedimentation During Construction

Excessive sedimentation during construction is more likely to be a concern for Options I, II, IV and V than Option III due to the placement of the WRSA's higher up in their catchments and the need for more sediment control structures with the potential to fail. The consequence of excessive sedimentation relates primarily to impacts to the water quality and fisheries in the receiving waters, especially Fish Creek and the Taseko River.

Excessive Sedimentation During Operations

Excessive sedimentation during operations is slightly more likely for Options I, II, IV and V than for Option III for the same reasons as noted above for construction. Also, as with construction, the potential impacts or consequences of a failure of this mode relate primarily to impacts to the water quality and fisheries of the receiving waters.

Release of ARD from PAG - Outside WRSA

The likelihood of a release of acid rock drainage outside the WRSA is considered low for all options. If ARD was released however the consequences are slightly more significant for Options I, II, IV and V due to the presence of the Fish Creek and Taseko River systems. The release of ARD could result in acidic water entering the receiving waters. This could have the affect of lowering the pH and impacting the water quality and fisheries of these waters.

4.4 FISHERIES COMPENSATION FACILITIES

The fisheries compensation facilities, or structures, have been divided into six different failure modes. The first mode considers the likelihood and consequence of a failure of the channel diversions to maintain the minimum required flows for sustaining a productive capacity and the second consider the effects of excessive flows, e.g. a probable maximum flood (PMF), within the diversion channels. The final four modes consider the likelihood and consequences of icing of the diversion channels or habitat areas during winter, dam instability in any of the structures built as part of the compensation program, and excessive sedimentation during both construction and operations.

A brief description of each failure mode related to the fisheries compensation facilities are presented below.

Failure of Diversions (Insufficient Flows)

Insufficient flows are defined as flows below which fish would survive, or be subjected to excessive stresses, within the diversion channels. The occurrence of these insufficient flows would have a significant impact on the fish within these channels with the consequences of the low flows being determined primarily based on the amount that the affected areas are used by fish. The likelihood of insufficient flows increase for Options I, II due to the lower natural flows and smaller catchment area of the Tete Angela system relative to the Fish Creek system.

Excessive Flows (PMF)

Excessive flows within the diversion channels would likely cause excessive amounts of erosion and possible destruction of fish habitat structures within the affected channel. As well, the erosive forces of a PMF could result in excessive sedimentation of the stream water causing significant stress to the fish. The likelihood of these excessive flows is slightly less for options that include fish compensation structures within the Tete Angela system due to the smaller catchment of this tributary.

Icing of Channels or Habitat Areas

The likelihood of icing of the constructed channels and habitat areas of the fisheries compensation facilities is considered moderate for Options III, IV and V and slightly more likely for Options I and II. Icing is expected to be a concern during severe winter periods when flows are low within the channels. This is expected to be more of a concern for the channels of the Tete Angela system (part of Option I and II fisheries compensation) due to the lower predicted average winter flows. The consequence of channel or habitat areas icing is the potential for winter kills of fish inhabiting these areas.

Dam Instability

Current plans for the fisheries compensation facilities require the construction of moderately sized impoundment dams as part of all options except Option III. Instability of any of these dam structures could result in the failure of these options to maintain minimum water levels in the compensation channels. Consequences of a dam failure could include the destruction of constructed fish habitat structures, flooding of areas downstream of the failure, and the resulting inability to regulate flows in the fish habitat channels downstream of a failed dam.

Excessive Sedimentation During Construction

The likelihood of excessive sedimentation occurring during construction of the fisheries compensation facilities is high for Option III and slightly higher for all of the other options. The increased likelihood for the other options is due to the fact that the construction activities are taking place in either partially, as is the case for Options I and II, or totally, as is the case for Options IV and V, existing channels.

Option III, on the other hand, will involve almost entirely new construction of channels or work within channels that have been shown not to contain any fish. The consequence of excessive sedimentation relates primarily to the resulting impacts to water quality and fisheries within the receiving waters.

Excessive Sedimentation During Operations

Excessive sedimentation during operations has a low probability of occurrence for Option III and is even less likely for all of the other options. Option III has a higher probability due to the increased length of the compensation channels as well as the larger catchment of the Fish Lake basin resulting in higher flows within the streams giving rise to higher erosional forces. Sedimentation would primarily be due to erosion causing a failure of the stream banks causing increased siltation within the compensation stream channels. The consequence of excessive sedimentation within the compensation facilities would primarily be a deterioration of water quality impacting on fisheries in the streams.

4.5 WATER AND TAILINGS MANAGEMENT/DISTRIBUTION

Water Pipeline Rupture

The likelihood of rupture of the water pipeline for Option III is considered to be low. For all other options the likelihood of a failure increases substantially due to the increased length of the pipelines relative to Option III and the increase in pumping heads and corresponding pipeline pressures due to the increased elevation of the TSF.

Water Pump Station Failure

As is the case for the potential for a water pipeline rupture, the likelihood of a water pump station failure increases substantially with Options I, II, IV and V. This is primarily due to the increase in pumping distances and pumping heads in comparison to Option III.

Tailings Pipeline Rupture

The likelihood of a tailings pipeline rupture is considered low for Option III but increases substantially for all of the other options. This increase in likelihood is primarily due to the increased distances over which the tailings are transported and the increased pumping heads associated with pumping to higher elevations. The consequence of a failure is also considered more significant for Options I, II, IV and V particularly with respect to the water quality and fisheries of the Fish Lake system.

Tailings Pump Station Failure

The likelihood of a tailings pump station failure is considered moderate for Option III and increases substantially for the other options. This increase is due to the increased distances of required pumping and the increased pumping heads. The consequence of a pump station failure is mostly a concern with respect to operations, but is also a moderate concern for environmental factors with the chance that tailings material may be discharged into the environment having an impact on waterways and biophysical habitat.

Tailings Distribution Failure - Poor Pond Location

The likelihood of a tailings distribution failure is dependent primarily on the configuration of the tailings facility, i.e. is the facility more difficult to operate because of its configuration, and its size. Smaller facilities tend to be more difficult to operate than larger ones. Based on this criteria, Options I and V have a greater likelihood of having a tailings distribution failure while Options II and IV are similar to Option III. The consequence of a failure of the tailings distribution system would primarily be related to operations.

Excessive Make-Up Water Requirements

The likelihood of excessive make-up water requirements decreases with a decrease in the size of the facilities and mining operation, i.e. decreased through-put. Using this criteria, Options I and V have a decreased likelihood of failure due to the smaller pit size and corresponding mill throughput quantities.

4.6 MILL SITE

The mill site has been divided into two failure modes. Both of the failure modes relate to materials that are stored or used on site as part of the milling processes. The likelihood of a failure relating to the spilling of chemicals or reagents or hydrocarbons is relatively low for all of the options but the consequences differ due to the project layout and the environmental factors at risk from a spill.

Reagent/Chemical Spills

The likelihood of a reasonable size spill of reagent or chemical at the mill site is considered low for all of the options. It is expected that should a spill occur it would be local in geographic extent and limited in terms of time frame, as a spill contingency and clean-up plan is part of the mill operation. There is no real difference in the potential for a failure between any of the options although the consequences are slightly more significant for Options I, II, IV and V due to the presence of the Fish Lake system.

Hydrocarbon Spills

The likelihood of a hydrocarbon spill is also considered low for all options. It is expected that should a spill occur it would be local in geographic extent and limited in terms of time frame as a spill contingency and clean-up plan is part of the mill operation. There is no real difference in the potential for a failure between any of the options although the consequences are slightly more significant for Options I, II, IV and V due to the presence of the Fish Lake system.

SECTION 5.0 - RESULTS AND SUMMARY

Table 13 summarizes the results of this project risk assessment. A letter grading scheme, with 6 classes from A^+ to B^-, is used to demonstrate the differences between the various consequence categories and mine components of the five options. An overall letter grade has been assigned to each of the five options.

TASEKO MINES LIMITED
PROSPERITY PROJECT

PROJECT RISK ASSESSMENT

PART OF A MULTIPLE ACCOUNTS EVALUATION FOR SELECTION OF A PREFERRED MINE DEVELOPMENT PLAN

TABLE 1a

SUBJECTIVE RANKING SCHEME (ABSOLUTE)

Likelihood of Occurrence (Probability)	Consequences
1 Extremely Low (~ 1:50,000)	**A** Extremely Low
2 Low (~ 1:10,000)	**B** Low
3 Moderate (~ 1:1000)	**C** Moderate
4 High (~ 1:100)	**D** High
5 Extremely High (~ 1:10)	**E** Extremely High

Note: Likelihoods estimated for duration of construction, operations, and closure periods.

TABLE 1b

SUBJECTIVE RANKING SCHEME (RELATIVE)

Relative Likelihood of Occurrence (Probability)	Relative Consequences
i Less Likely	**a** Less Significant
ii Slightly Less Likely	**b** Slightly Less Significant
iii Similar Likelihood	**c** Similar Consequences
iv Slightly More Likely	**d** Slightly More Significant
v More Likely	**e** More Significant

TASEKO MINES LIMITED
PROSPERITY PROJECT

PROJECT RISK ASSESSMENT

PART OF A MULTIPLE ACCOUNTS EVALUATION FOR SELECTION OF A PREFERRED MINE DEVELOPMENT PLAN

TABLE 2

COMPARATIVE COLOUR CODING

Absolute and Relative Likelihood of Occurrence (Probability) / Absolute and Relative Consequences	Extremely Low **(1)** or Less Likely **(i)**	Low **(2)** or Slightly Less Likely **(ii)**	Moderate **(3)** or Similar Likelihood **(iii)**	High **(4)** or Slightly More Likely **(iv)**	Extremely High **(5)** or More Likely **(v)**
Extremely Low **(A)** or Less Significant **(a)**	i – a or 1-A	ii – a or 2-A	iii – a or 3-A	iv – a or 4-A	v – a or 5-A
Low **(B)** or Slightly Less Significant **(b)**	i – b or 1-B	ii – b or 2-B	iii – b or 3-B	iv – b or 4-B	v – b or 5-B
Moderate **(C)** or Similar **(c)**	i – c or 1-C	ii – c or 2-C	iii – c or 3-C	iv – c or 4-C	v – c or 5-C
High **(D)** or Slightly More Significant **(d)**	i – d or 1-D	ii – d or 2-D	iii – d or 3-D	iv – d or 4-D	v – d or 5-D
Extremely High **(E)** or More Significant **(e)**	i – e or 1-E	ii – e or 2-E	iii – e or 3-E	iv – e or 4-E	v – e or 5-E

TASEKO MINES LIMITED
PROSPERITY PROJECT

PROJECT RISK ASSESSMENT

PART OF A MULTIPLE ACCOUNTS EVALUATION FOR SELECTION OF A PREFERRED MINE DEVELOPMENT PLAN

TABLE 3
OPTION III - SUBJECTIVE LIKELIHOOD AND CONSEQUENCE RATINGS (ABSOLUTE RATING)

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Project Component / Failure Mode	Likelihood of Occurrence	Consequences				
		Human Life	Water Quality	Fisheries	Wildlife / Biophysical	Operations
1. Open Pit						
1.1 Large South pit wall failure	2	B	A	A	A	D
1.2 Large East pit wall failure	2	B	A	A	A	E
1.3 Large Other pit wall failure	2	B	A	A	A	D
1.4 Excessive seepage from Fish Lake	1	B	B	A	C	C
1.5 Excessive seepage from deep aquifer	2	A	A	A	A	C
1.6 Inter-ramp pit wall failure (localized)	4	B	A	A	A	B
1.7 Vertical depressurization pump failure	3	A	A	A	A	C
1.8 Pit sump pump (and backup) failure	3	A	A	A	A	B
2. Tailings Storage Facility						
2.1 Seepage through main embankment	1	A	B	B	B	B
2.2 Seepage through saddle embankment(s)	2	A	D	D	C	C
2.3 Seepage through foundations	2	A	B	B	B	C
2.4 Internal erosion (piping)	1	B	C	C	B	E
2.5 Overtopping of embankment (spillway failure)	1	B	C	C	B	E
2.6 Embankment instability	1	B	C	C	C	E
2.7 Insufficient PAG waste rock submergence	3	A	B	B	B	C
2.8 Seepage collection / recycle system failure	2	A	B	B	B	B
2.9 Excessive sedimentation during construction	2	A	D	D	C	B
2.10 Excessive sedimentation during operations	1	A	D	D	C	B
2.11 Relaease of ARD from PAG - outside TSF	1	A	B	B	B	B
3. Waste Rock Storage Areas (WRSA)						
3.1 Instability	2	B	B	B	C	C
3.2 Improper sorting in pit (PAG to WRSA)	3	A	B	C	C	B
3.3 Excessive sedimentation during construction	2	A	C	C	B	B
3.4 Excessive sedimentation during operations	1	A	C	D	C	B
3.5 Release of ARD from PAG - outside WRSA	2	A	D	D	C	C
4. Fisheries Compensation Facilities						
4.1 Failure of diversions (insufficient flows)	3	A	A	D	B	A
4.2 Excessive flows (PMF)	3	A	C	C	B	C
4.3 Icing of channels or habitat areas	3	A	A	D	B	C
4.4 Dam instability	2	A	C	D	B	C
4.5 Excessive sedimentation during construction	4	A	D	D	B	B
4.6 Excessive sedimentation during operations	2	A	C	D	B	C
5. Water and Tailings Management / Distribution						
5.1 Water pipeline rupture	2	A	B	B	B	D
5.2 Water pump station failure	3	A	B	B	B	D
5.3 Tailings pipeline rupture	2	A	C	C	C	D
5.4 Tailings pump station failure	3	A	C	C	B	D
5.5 Tailings distribution failure - poor pond location	2	A	B	B	B	C
5.6 Excessive make-up water requirements	3	A	B	B	B	C
6. Mill Site						
6.1 Reagent / chemical spills	2	A	B	B	C	B
6.2 Hydrocarbon spills	2	A	B	B	D	B

Note: 1. All 'consequence' ratings consider potential consequences or impacts on fisheries, water and biophysical resources present after construction.

TASEKO MINES LIMITED
PROSPERITY PROJECT

PROJECT RISK ASSESSMENT

PART OF A MULTIPLE ACCOUNTS EVALUATION FOR SELECTION OF A PREFERRED MINE DEVELOPMENT PLAN

TABLE 4
OPTION I - SUBJECTIVE LIKELIHOOD AND CONSEQUENCE RATINGS (RELATIVE TO OPTION III)

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Project Component / Failure Mode	Relative Likelihood of Occurrence	Relative Consequences				
		Human Life	Water Quality	Fisheries	Wildlife / Biophysical	Operations
1. Open Pit						
1.1 Large South pit wall failure	i	d	c	e	d	e
1.2 Large East pit wall failure	ii	c	c	c	c	c
1.3 Large Other pit wall failure	ii	c	d	e	c	d
1.4 Excessive seepage from Fish Lake	iv	c	c	d	d	e
1.5 Excessive seepage from deep aquifer	ii	c	c	c	c	c
1.6 Inter-ramp pit wall failure (localized)	iii	c	c	c	c	c
1.7 Vertical depressurization pump failure	iii	c	c	c	c	c
1.8 Pit sump pump (and backup) failure	ii	c	c	c	c	c
2. Tailings Storage Facility						
2.1 Seepage through main embankment	iii	c	d	d	d	c
2.2 Seepage through saddle embankment(s)	ii	c	b	a	a	b
2.3 Seepage through foundations	ii	c	d	d	d	c
2.4 Internal erosion (piping)	iii	b	d	c	c	c
2.5 Overtopping of embankment (spillway failure)	iii	b	d	d	d	c
2.6 Embankment instability	iv	b	e	e	d	c
2.7 Insufficient PAG waste rock submergence	iv	c	e	e	c	c
2.8 Seepage collection / recycle system failure	ii	c	e	e	c	c
2.9 Excessive sedimentation during construction	v	c	e	e	c	c
2.10 Excessive sedimentation during operations	iv	c	e	e	c	d
2.11 Relaease of ARD from PAG - outside TSF	iv	c	d	d	c	c
3. Waste Rock Storage Areas (WRSA)						
3.1 Instability	iv	c	d	d	d	d
3.2 Improper sorting in pit (PAG to WRSA)	iii	c	d	d	c	d
3.3 Excessive sedimentation during construction	v	c	e	e	c	c
3.4 Excessive sedimentation during operations	iv	c	d	d	c	d
3.5 Release of ARD from PAG - outside WRSA	iii	c	d	d	d	d
4. Fisheries Compensation Facilities						
4.1 Failure of diversions (insufficient flows)	iv	c	d	c	c	c
4.2 Excessive flows (PMF)	ii	c	d	c	c	c
4.3 Icing of channels or habitat areas	iv	c	c	c	c	c
4.4 Dam instability	iii	c	d	d	c	c
4.5 Excessive sedimentation during construction	iv	c	c	c	c	c
4.6 Excessive sedimentation during operations	i	c	c	c	c	c
5. Water and Tailings Management / Distribution						
5.1 Water pipeline rupture	v	c	d	d	d	d
5.2 Water pump station failure	v	c	d	d	d	d
5.3 Tailings pipeline rupture	v	c	e	d	d	d
5.4 Tailings pump station failure	v	c	d	c	d	d
5.5 Tailings distribution failure - poor pond location	iv	c	c	c	c	c
5.6 Excessive make-up water requirements	ii	c	c	c	c	c
6. Mill Site						
6.1 Reagent / chemical spills	iii	c	c	c	c	c
6.2 Hydrocarbon spills	iii	c	d	d	d	c

Notes: 1. All 'consequence' ratings consider potential consequences or impacts on fisheries, water and biophysical resources present after construction.
2. All 'likelihood' and 'consequence' ratings are *relative* to the Option III MDP as detailed in Table 1B.

Relative Likelihood of Occurrence (Probability)	***Relative Consequences***
i Less Likely	*a Less Significant*
ii Slightly Less Likely	*b Slightly Less Significant*
iii Similar Likelihood	*c Similar Consequences*
iv Slightly More Likely	*d Slightly More Significant*
v More Likely	*e More Significant*

TASEKO MINES LIMITED
PROSPERITY PROJECT

PROJECT RISK ASSESSMENT

PART OF A MULTIPLE ACCOUNTS EVALUATION FOR SELECTION OF A PREFERRED MINE DEVELOPMENT PLAN

TABLE 5
OPTION II - SUBJECTIVE LIKELIHOOD AND CONSEQUENCE RATINGS (RELATIVE TO OPTION III)

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Project Component / Failure Mode	Relative Likelihood of Occurrence	Relative Consequences				
		Human Life	Water Quality	Fisheries	Wildlife / Biophysical	Operations
1. Open Pit						
1.1 Large South pit wall failure	ii	d	c	e	d	e
1.2 Large East pit wall failure	iii	c	c	c	c	c
1.3 Large Other pit wall failure	ii	c	d	e	c	d
1.4 Excessive seepage from Fish Lake	v	c	c	d	d	e
1.5 Excessive seepage from deep aquifer	iv	c	c	c	c	d
1.6 Inter-ramp pit wall failure (localized)	ii	c	c	c	c	c
1.7 Vertical depressurization pump failure	iii	c	c	c	c	c
1.8 Pit sump pump (and backup) failure	iii	c	c	c	c	c
2. Tailings Storage Facility						
2.1 Seepage through main embankment	iii	c	d	d	d	c
2.2 Seepage through saddle embankment(s)	ii	c	b	a	a	b
2.3 Seepage through foundations	iii	c	d	d	d	c
2.4 Internal erosion (piping)	iii	b	d	c	c	c
2.5 Overtopping of embankment (spillway failure)	iii	b	d	d	d	d
2.6 Embankment instability	iv	b	e	e	d	c
2.7 Insufficient PAG waste rock submergence	iii	c	e	e	c	c
2.8 Seepage collection / recycle system failure	ii	c	e	e	c	c
2.9 Excessive sedimentation during construction	v	c	e	e	c	c
2.10 Excessive sedimentation during operations	iv	c	e	e	c	d
2.11 Relaease of ARD from PAG - outside TSF	iv	c	d	d	c	c
3. Waste Rock Storage Areas (WRSA)						
3.1 Instability	iv	c	d	d	d	d
3.2 Improper sorting in pit (PAG to WRSA)	iii	c	d	d	c	d
3.3 Excessive sedimentation during construction	v	c	e	e	c	c
3.4 Excessive sedimentation during operations	iv	c	d	d	c	d
3.5 Release of ARD from PAG - outside WRSA	iii	c	d	d	d	d
4. Fisheries Compensation Facilities						
4.1 Failure of diversions (insufficient flows)	iv	c	d	c	c	c
4.2 Excessive flows (PMF)	ii	c	d	c	c	c
4.3 Icing of channels or habitat areas	iv	c	c	c	c	c
4.4 Dam instability	iii	c	d	d	c	c
4.5 Excessive sedimentation during construction	iv	c	c	c	c	c
4.6 Excessive sedimentation during operations	i	c	c	c	c	c
5. Water and Tailings Management / Distribution						
5.1 Water pipeline rupture	v	c	d	d	d	d
5.2 Water pump station failure	v	c	d	d	d	d
5.3 Tailings pipeline rupture	v	c	e	d	d	d
5.4 Tailings pump station failure	v	c	d	c	d	d
5.5 Tailings distribution failure - poor pond location	iii	c	c	c	c	c
5.6 Excessive make-up water requirements	iii	c	c	c	c	c
6. Mill Site						
6.1 Reagent / chemical spills	iii	c	c	c	c	c
6.2 Hydrocarbon spills	iii	c	d	d	d	c

Notes: 1. All 'consequence' ratings consider potential consequences or impacts on fisheries, water and biophysical resources present after construction.
2. All 'likelihood' and 'consequence' ratings are *relative* to the Option III MDP as detailed in Table 1B.

Relative Likelihood of Occurrence (Probability)	*Relative Consequences*
i Less Likely	*a Less Significant*
ii Slightly Less Likely	*b Slightly Less Significant*
iii Similar Likelihood	*c Similar Consequences*
iv Slightly More Likely	*d Slightly More Significant*
v More Likely	*e More Significant*

TASEKO MINES LIMITED
PROSPERITY PROJECT

PROJECT RISK ASSESSMENT

PART OF A MULTIPLE ACCOUNTS EVALUATION FOR SELECTION OF A PREFERRED MINE DEVELOPMENT PLAN

TABLE 6
OPTION IV - SUBJECTIVE LIKELIHOOD AND CONSEQUENCE RATINGS (RELATIVE TO OPTION III)

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Project Component / Failure Mode	Relative Likelihood of Occurrence	Relative Consequences				
		Human Life	Water Quality	Fisheries	Wildlife / Biophysical	Operations
1. Open Pit						
1.1 Large South pit wall failure	ii	d	c	e	d	e
1.2 Large East pit wall failure	iii	c	c	c	c	c
1.3 Large Other pit wall failure	ii	c	d	e	c	d
1.4 Excessive seepage from Fish Lake	v	c	c	e	d	e
1.5 Excessive seepage from deep aquifer	iv	c	c	c	c	d
1.6 Inter-ramp pit wall failure (localized)	ii	c	c	c	c	c
1.7 Vertical depressurization pump failure	iii	c	c	c	c	c
1.8 Pit sump pump (and backup) failure	iii	c	c	c	c	c
2. Tailings Storage Facility						
2.1 Seepage through main embankment	iii	c	d	d	d	c
2.2 Seepage through saddle embankment(s)	iii	c	c	a	a	c
2.3 Seepage through foundations	iv	c	d	d	d	c
2.4 Internal erosion (piping)	iii	d	d	c	c	d
2.5 Overtopping of embankment (spillway failure)	iii	d	e	d	d	d
2.6 Embankment instability	iv	d	e	e	d	d
2.7 Insufficient PAG waste rock submergence	iii	c	d	e	c	c
2.8 Seepage collection / recycle system failure	iii	c	d	e	d	c
2.9 Excessive sedimentation during construction	v	c	d	e	c	c
2.10 Excessive sedimentation during operations	iv	c	d	e	c	d
2.11 Relaease of ARD from PAG - outside TSF	iv	c	d	d	c	c
3. Waste Rock Storage Areas (WRSA)						
3.1 Instability	iv	c	d	d	c	d
3.2 Improper sorting in pit (PAG to WRSA)	iii	c	d	d	c	d
3.3 Excessive sedimentation during construction	v	c	e	e	b	c
3.4 Excessive sedimentation during operations	iv	c	d	d	b	d
3.5 Release of ARD from PAG - outside WRSA	iii	c	d	d	d	d
4. Fisheries Compensation Facilities						
4.1 Failure of diversions (insufficient flows)	iv	c	c	c	c	c
4.2 Excessive flows (PMF)	ii	c	c	c	c	c
4.3 Icing of channels or habitat areas	iii	c	c	c	c	c
4.4 Dam instability	iii	c	c	d	c	d
4.5 Excessive sedimentation during construction	iv	c	d	d	c	c
4.6 Excessive sedimentation during operations	ii	c	d	d	c	d
5. Water and Tailings Management / Distribution						
5.1 Water pipeline rupture	iv	c	d	c	c	d
5.2 Water pump station failure	iv	c	d	c	c	d
5.3 Tailings pipeline rupture	iv	c	e	d	d	d
5.4 Tailings pump station failure	iv	c	d	d	d	d
5.5 Tailings distribution failure - poor pond location	iii	c	d	c	c	d
5.6 Excessive make-up water requirements	iii	c	c	c	c	c
6. Mill Site						
6.1 Reagent / chemical spills	iii	c	c	c	c	c
6.2 Hydrocarbon spills	iii	c	d	d	c	c

Notes: 1. All 'consequence' ratings consider potential consequences or impacts on fisheries, water and biophysical resources present after construction.
2. All 'likelihood' and 'consequence' ratings are *relative* to the Option III MDP as detailed in Table 1B.

Relative Likelihood of Occurrence (Probability)	***Relative Consequences***
i Less Likely	*a Less Significant*
ii Slightly Less Likely	*b Slightly Less Significant*
iii Similar Likelihood	*c Similar Consequences*
iv Slightly More Likely	*d Slightly More Significant*
v More Likely	*e More Significant*

TASEKO MINES LIMITED
PROSPERITY PROJECT

PROJECT RISK ASSESSMENT

PART OF A MULTIPLE ACCOUNTS EVALUATION FOR SELECTION OF A PREFERRED MINE DEVELOPMENT PLAN

TABLE 7
OPTION V - SUBJECTIVE LIKELIHOOD AND CONSEQUENCE RATINGS (RELATIVE TO OPTION III)

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Project Component / Failure Mode	Relative Likelihood of Occurrence	Relative Consequences				
		Human Life	Water Quality	Fisheries	Wildlife / Biophysical	Operations
1. Open Pit						
1.1 Large South pit wall failure	i	d	c	d	d	e
1.2 Large East pit wall failure	ii	c	c	c	c	c
1.3 Large Other pit wall failure	ii	c	d	d	c	d
1.4 Excessive seepage from Fish Lake	iv	c	c	d	d	e
1.5 Excessive seepage from deep aquifer	ii	c	c	c	c	c
1.6 Inter-ramp pit wall failure (localized)	iii	c	c	c	c	c
1.7 Vertical depressurization pump failure	iii	c	c	c	c	c
1.8 Pit sump pump (and backup) failure	ii	c	c	c	c	c
2. Tailings Storage Facility						
2.1 Seepage through main embankment	iii	c	d	d	d	c
2.2 Seepage through saddle embankment(s)	iii	c	c	a	a	c
2.3 Seepage through foundations	iv	c	d	d	d	c
2.4 Internal erosion (piping)	iii	d	d	c	c	d
2.5 Overtopping of embankment (spillway failure)	iii	d	e	d	d	d
2.6 Embankment instability	iv	d	e	e	d	d
2.7 Insufficient PAG waste rock submergence	iv	c	d	e	c	c
2.8 Seepage collection / recycle system failure	iii	c	d	e	d	c
2.9 Excessive sedimentation during construction	v	c	d	e	c	c
2.10 Excessive sedimentation during operations	iv	c	d	e	c	d
2.11 Relaease of ARD from PAG - outside TSF	iv	c	d	d	c	c
3. Waste Rock Storage Areas (WRSA)						
3.1 Instability	iv	c	d	d	d	d
3.2 Improper sorting in pit (PAG to WRSA)	iii	c	d	d	c	d
3.3 Excessive sedimentation during construction	v	c	e	e	c	c
3.4 Excessive sedimentation during operations	iv	c	d	d	c	d
3.5 Release of ARD from PAG - outside WRSA	iii	c	d	d	d	d
4. Fisheries Compensation Facilities						
4.1 Failure of diversions (insufficient flows)	iv	c	c	c	c	c
4.2 Excessive flows (PMF)	ii	c	c	c	c	c
4.3 Icing of channels or habitat areas	iii	c	c	c	c	c
4.4 Dam instability	iii	c	c	d	c	d
4.5 Excessive sedimentation during construction	iv	c	d	d	c	c
4.6 Excessive sedimentation during operations	ii	c	d	d	c	d
5. Water and Tailings Management / Distribution						
5.1 Water pipeline rupture	iv	c	d	c	c	d
5.2 Water pump station failure	iv	c	d	c	c	d
5.3 Tailings pipeline rupture	iv	c	e	d	d	d
5.4 Tailings pump station failure	iv	c	d	d	d	d
5.5 Tailings distribution failure - poor pond location	iv	c	d	c	c	d
5.6 Excessive make-up water requirements	ii	c	c	c	c	c
6. Mill Site						
6.1 Reagent / chemical spills	iii	c	c	c	c	c
6.2 Hydrocarbon spills	iii	c	d	d	d	c

Notes: 1. All 'consequence' ratings consider potential consequences or impacts on fisheries, water and biophysical resources present after construction.
2. All 'likelihood' and 'consequence' ratings are *relative* to the Option III MDP as detailed in Table 1B.

Relative Likelihood of Occurrence (Probability)	***Relative Consequences***
i Less Likely	*a Less Significant*
ii Slightly Less Likely	*b Slightly Less Significant*
iii Similar Likelihood	*c Similar Consequences*
iv Slightly More Likely	*d Slightly More Significant*
v More Likely	*e More Significant*

TASEKO MINES LIMITED
PROSPERITY PROJECT

PROJECT RISK ASSESSMENT

PART OF A MULTIPLE ACCOUNTS EVALUATION FOR SELECTION OF A PREFERRED MINE DEVELOPMENT PLAN

TABLE 8
OPTION I - SUBJECTIVE LIKELIHOOD AND CONSEQUENCE RATINGS (ABSOLUTE RATING)

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Project Component / Failure Mode	Likelihood of Occurrence	Consequences				
		Human Life	Water Quality	Fisheries	Wildlife / Biophysical	Operations
1. Open Pit						
1.1 Large South pit wall failure	1	C	A	C	B	E
1.2 Large East pit wall failure	1	B	A	A	A	E
1.3 Large Other pit wall failure	1	B	B	C	A	E
1.4 Excessive seepage from Fish Lake	2	B	B	B	D	E
1.5 Excessive seepage from deep aquifer	1	A	A	A	A	C
1.6 Inter-ramp pit wall failure (localized)	4	B	A	A	A	B
1.7 Vertical depressurization pump failure	3	A	A	A	A	C
1.8 Pit sump pump (and backup) failure	2	A	A	A	A	B
2. Tailings Storage Facility						
2.1 Seepage through main embankment	1	A	C	C	C	B
2.2 Seepage through saddle embankment(s)	1	A	C	B	A	B
2.3 Seepage through foundations	1	A	C	C	C	C
2.4 Internal erosion (piping)	1	A	D	C	B	E
2.5 Overtopping of embankment (spillway failure)	1	A	D	D	C	E
2.6 Embankment instability	2	A	E	E	D	E
2.7 Insufficient PAG waste rock submergence	4	A	D	D	B	C
2.8 Seepage collection / recycle system failure	1	A	D	D	B	B
2.9 Excessive sedimentation during construction	4	A	E	E	C	B
2.10 Excessive sedimentation during operations	2	A	E	E	C	C
2.11 Relaease of ARD from PAG - outside TSF	2	A	C	C	B	B
3. Waste Rock Storage Areas (WRSA)						
3.1 Instability	3	B	C	C	D	D
3.2 Improper sorting in pit (PAG to WRSA)	3	A	C	D	C	C
3.3 Excessive sedimentation during construction	4	A	E	E	B	B
3.4 Excessive sedimentation during operations	2	A	D	E	C	C
3.5 Release of ARD from PAG - outside WRSA	2	A	E	E	D	D
4. Fisheries Compensation Facilities						
4.1 Failure of diversions (insufficient flows)	4	A	B	D	B	A
4.2 Excessive flows (PMF)	2	A	D	C	B	C
4.3 Icing of channels or habitat areas	4	A	A	D	B	C
4.4 Dam instability	2	A	D	E	B	C
4.5 Excessive sedimentation during construction	5	A	D	D	B	B
4.6 Excessive sedimentation during operations	1	A	C	D	B	C
5. Water and Tailings Management / Distribution						
5.1 Water pipeline rupture	4	A	C	C	C	E
5.2 Water pump station failure	5	A	C	C	C	E
5.3 Tailings pipeline rupture	4	A	E	D	D	E
5.4 Tailings pump station failure	5	A	D	C	C	E
5.5 Tailings distribution failure - poor pond location	3	A	B	B	B	C
5.6 Excessive make-up water requirements	2	A	B	B	B	C
6. Mill Site						
6.1 Reagent / chemical spills	2	A	B	B	C	B
6.2 Hydrocarbon spills	2	A	C	C	E	B

Notes: 1. All 'consequence' ratings consider potential consequences or impacts on fisheries, water and biophysical resources present after construction.

TASEKO MINES LIMITED
PROSPERITY PROJECT

PROJECT RISK ASSESSMENT

PART OF A MULTIPLE ACCOUNTS EVALUATION FOR SELECTION OF A PREFERRED MINE DEVELOPMENT PLAN

TABLE 9
OPTION II - SUBJECTIVE LIKELIHOOD AND CONSEQUENCE RATINGS (ABSOLUTE RATING)

Modified: 19-Nov-98
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Project Component / Failure Mode	Likelihood of Occurrence	Consequences				
		Human Life	Water Quality	Fisheries	Wildlife / Biophysical	Operations
1. Open Pit						
1.1 Large South pit wall failure	1	C	A	C	B	E
1.2 Large East pit wall failure	2	B	A	A	A	E
1.3 Large Other pit wall failure	1	B	B	C	A	E
1.4 Excessive seepage from Fish Lake	3	B	B	B	D	E
1.5 Excessive seepage from deep aquifer	3	A	A	A	A	D
1.6 Inter-ramp pit wall failure (localized)	3	B	A	A	A	B
1.7 Vertical depressurization pump failure	3	A	A	A	A	C
1.8 Pit sump pump (and backup) failure	3	A	A	A	A	B
2. Tailings Storage Facility						
2.1 Seepage through main embankment	1	A	C	C	C	B
2.2 Seepage through saddle embankment(s)	1	A	C	B	A	B
2.3 Seepage through foundations	2	A	C	C	C	C
2.4 Internal erosion (piping)	1	A	D	C	B	E
2.5 Overtopping of embankment (spillway failure)	1	A	D	D	C	E
2.6 Embankment instability	2	A	E	E	D	E
2.7 Insufficient PAG waste rock submergence	3	A	D	D	B	C
2.8 Seepage collection / recycle system failure	1	A	D	D	B	B
2.9 Excessive sedimentation during construction	4	A	E	E	C	B
2.10 Excessive sedimentation during operations	2	A	E	E	C	C
2.11 Relaease of ARD from PAG - outside TSF	2	A	C	C	B	B
3. Waste Rock Storage Areas (WRSA)						
3.1 Instability	3	B	C	C	D	D
3.2 Improper sorting in pit (PAG to WRSA)	3	A	C	D	C	C
3.3 Excessive sedimentation during construction	4	A	E	E	B	B
3.4 Excessive sedimentation during operations	2	A	D	E	C	C
3.5 Release of ARD from PAG - outside WRSA	2	A	E	E	D	D
4. Fisheries Compensation Facilities						
4.1 Failure of diversions (insufficient flows)	4	A	B	D	B	A
4.2 Excessive flows (PMF)	2	A	D	C	B	C
4.3 Icing of channels or habitat areas	4	A	A	D	B	C
4.4 Dam instability	2	A	D	E	B	C
4.5 Excessive sedimentation during construction	5	A	D	D	B	B
4.6 Excessive sedimentation during operations	1	A	C	D	B	C
5. Water and Tailings Management / Distribution						
5.1 Water pipeline rupture	4	A	C	C	C	E
5.2 Water pump station failure	5	A	C	C	C	E
5.3 Tailings pipeline rupture	4	A	E	D	D	E
5.4 Tailings pump station failure	5	A	D	C	C	E
5.5 Tailings distribution failure - poor pond location	2	A	B	B	B	C
5.6 Excessive make-up water requirements	3	A	B	B	B	C
6. Mill Site						
6.1 Reagent / chemical spills	2	A	B	B	C	B
6.2 Hydrocarbon spills	2	A	C	C	E	B

Notes: 1. All 'consequence' ratings consider potential consequences or impacts on fisheries, water and biophysical resources present after construction.

TASEKO MINES LIMITED
PROSPERITY PROJECT

PROJECT RISK ASSESSMENT

PART OF A MULTIPLE ACCOUNTS EVALUATION FOR SELECTION OF A PREFERRED MINE DEVELOPMENT PLAN

TABLE 10
OPTION IV - SUBJECTIVE LIKELIHOOD AND CONSEQUENCE RATINGS (ABSOLUTE RATING)

Modified: 19-Nov-98
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Project Component / Failure Mode	Likelihood of Occurrence	Consequences				
		Human Life	Water Quality	Fisheries	Wildlife / Biophysical	Operations
1. Open Pit						
1.1 Large South pit wall failure	1	C	A	C	B	E
1.2 Large East pit wall failure	2	B	A	A	A	E
1.3 Large Other pit wall failure	1	B	B	C	A	E
1.4 Excessive seepage from Fish Lake	3	B	B	C	D	E
1.5 Excessive seepage from deep aquifer	3	A	A	A	A	D
1.6 Inter-ramp pit wall failure (localized)	3	B	A	A	A	B
1.7 Vertical depressurization pump failure	3	A	A	A	A	C
1.8 Pit sump pump (and backup) failure	3	A	A	A	A	B
2. Tailings Storage Facility						
2.1 Seepage through main embankment	1	A	C	C	C	B
2.2 Seepage through saddle embankment(s)	2	A	D	B	A	C
2.3 Seepage through foundations	3	A	C	C	C	C
2.4 Internal erosion (piping)	1	C	D	C	B	E
2.5 Overtopping of embankment (spillway failure)	1	C	E	D	C	E
2.6 Embankment instability	2	C	E	E	D	E
2.7 Insufficient PAG waste rock submergence	3	A	C	D	B	C
2.8 Seepage collection / recycle system failure	2	A	C	D	C	B
2.9 Excessive sedimentation during construction	4	A	E	E	C	B
2.10 Excessive sedimentation during operations	2	A	E	E	C	C
2.11 Relaease of ARD from PAG - outside TSF	2	A	C	C	B	B
3. Waste Rock Storage Areas (WRSA)						
3.1 Instability	3	B	C	C	C	D
3.2 Improper sorting in pit (PAG to WRSA)	3	A	C	D	C	C
3.3 Excessive sedimentation during construction	4	A	E	E	A	B
3.4 Excessive sedimentation during operations	2	A	D	E	B	C
3.5 Release of ARD from PAG - outside WRSA	2	A	E	E	D	D
4. Fisheries Compensation Facilities						
4.1 Failure of diversions (insufficient flows)	4	A	A	D	B	A
4.2 Excessive flows (PMF)	2	A	C	C	B	C
4.3 Icing of channels or habitat areas	3	A	A	D	B	C
4.4 Dam instability	2	A	C	E	B	D
4.5 Excessive sedimentation during construction	5	A	E	E	B	B
4.6 Excessive sedimentation during operations	1	A	D	E	B	D
5. Water and Tailings Management / Distribution						
5.1 Water pipeline rupture	3	A	C	B	B	E
5.2 Water pump station failure	4	A	C	B	B	E
5.3 Tailings pipeline rupture	3	A	E	D	D	E
5.4 Tailings pump station failure	4	A	D	D	C	E
5.5 Tailings distribution failure - poor pond location	2	A	C	B	B	D
5.6 Excessive make-up water requirements	3	A	B	B	B	C
6. Mill Site						
6.1 Reagent / chemical spills	2	A	B	B	C	B
6.2 Hydrocarbon spills	2	A	C	C	D	B

Notes: 1. All 'consequence' ratings consider potential consequences or impacts on fisheries, water and biophysical resources present after construction.

TASEKO MINES LIMITED
PROSPERITY PROJECT

PROJECT RISK ASSESSMENT

PART OF A MULTIPLE ACCOUNTS EVALUATION FOR SELECTION OF A PREFERRED MINE DEVELOPMENT PLAN

TABLE 11
OPTION V - SUBJECTIVE LIKELIHOOD AND CONSEQUENCE RATINGS (ABSOLUTE RATING)

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Project Component / Failure Mode	Likelihood of Occurrence	Consequences				
		Human Life	Water Quality	Fisheries	Wildlife / Biophysical	Operations
1. Open Pit						
1.1 Large South pit wall failure	1	C	A	B	B	E
1.2 Large East pit wall failure	1	B	A	A	A	E
1.3 Large Other pit wall failure	1	B	B	B	A	E
1.4 Excessive seepage from Fish Lake	2	B	B	B	D	E
1.5 Excessive seepage from deep aquifer	1	A	A	A	A	C
1.6 Inter-ramp pit wall failure (localized)	4	B	A	A	A	B
1.7 Vertical depressurization pump failure	3	A	A	A	A	C
1.8 Pit sump pump (and backup) failure	2	A	A	A	A	B
2. Tailings Storage Facility						
2.1 Seepage through main embankment	1	A	C	C	C	B
2.2 Seepage through saddle embankment(s)	2	A	D	B	A	C
2.3 Seepage through foundations	3	A	C	C	C	C
2.4 Internal erosion (piping)	1	C	D	C	B	E
2.5 Overtopping of embankment (spillway failure)	1	C	E	D	C	E
2.6 Embankment instability	2	C	E	E	D	E
2.7 Insufficient PAG waste rock submergence	4	A	C	D	B	C
2.8 Seepage collection / recycle system failure	2	A	C	D	C	B
2.9 Excessive sedimentation during construction	4	A	E	E	C	B
2.10 Excessive sedimentation during operations	2	A	E	E	C	C
2.11 Relaease of ARD from PAG - outside TSF	2	A	C	C	B	B
3. Waste Rock Storage Areas (WRSA)						
3.1 Instability	3	B	C	C	D	D
3.2 Improper sorting in pit (PAG to WRSA)	3	A	C	D	C	C
3.3 Excessive sedimentation during construction	4	A	E	E	B	B
3.4 Excessive sedimentation during operations	2	A	D	E	C	C
3.5 Release of ARD from PAG - outside WRSA	2	A	E	E	D	D
4. Fisheries Compensation Facilities						
4.1 Failure of diversions (insufficient flows)	4	A	A	D	B	A
4.2 Excessive flows (PMF)	2	A	C	C	B	C
4.3 Icing of channels or habitat areas	3	A	A	D	B	C
4.4 Dam instability	2	A	C	E	B	D
4.5 Excessive sedimentation during construction	5	A	E	E	B	B
4.6 Excessive sedimentation during operations	1	A	D	E	B	D
5. Water and Tailings Management / Distribution						
5.1 Water pipeline rupture	3	A	C	B	B	E
5.2 Water pump station failure	4	A	C	B	B	E
5.3 Tailings pipeline rupture	3	A	E	D	D	E
5.4 Tailings pump station failure	4	A	D	D	C	E
5.5 Tailings distribution failure - poor pond location	3	A	C	B	B	D
5.6 Excessive make-up water requirements	2	A	B	B	B	C
6. Mill Site						
6.1 Reagent / chemical spills	2	A	B	B	C	B
6.2 Hydrocarbon spills	2	A	C	C	E	B

Notes: 1. All 'consequence' ratings consider potential consequences or impacts on fisheries, water and biophysical resources present after construction.

TASEKO MINES LIMITED
PROSPERITY PROJECT

PROJECT RISK ASSESSMENT

PART OF A MULTIPLE ACCOUNTS EVALUATION FOR SELECTION OF A PREFERRED MINE DEVELOPMENT PLAN

TABLE 12
COMPARATIVE SUBJECTIVE SUMMARY (ALL OPTIONS WITH ABSOLUTE RATING)

Modified: 19-Nov-98
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Project Component and Failure Mode	Option I					Option II					Option III					Option IV					Option V				
	Human Life	Water Quality	Fisheries	Wildlife / Biophysical	Operations	Human Life	Water Quality	Fisheries	Wildlife / Biophysical	Operations	Human Life	Water Quality	Fisheries	Wildlife / Biophysical	Operations	Human Life	Water Quality	Fisheries	Wildlife / Biophysical	Operations	Human Life	Water Quality	Fisheries	Wildlife / Biophysical	Operations
1. Open Pit																									
1.1 Large South pit wall failure	1 - C	1 - A	1 - C	1 - B	1 - E	1 - C	1 - A	1 - C	1 - B	1 - E	2 - B	2 - A	2 - A	2 - A	2 - D	1 - C	1 - A	1 - C	1 - B	1 - E	1 - C	1 - A	1 - B	1 - B	1 - E
1.2 Large East pit wall failure	1 - B	1 - A	1 - A	1 - A	1 - E	2 - B	2 - A	2 - A	2 - A	2 - E	2 - B	2 - A	2 - A	2 - A	2 - E	2 - B	2 - A	2 - A	2 - A	2 - E	1 - B	1 - A	1 - A	1 - A	1 - E
1.3 Large Other pit wall failure	1 - B	1 - B	1 - C	1 - A	1 - E	1 - B	1 - B	1 - C	1 - A	1 - E	2 - B	2 - A	2 - A	2 - A	2 - D	1 - B	1 - B	1 - C	1 - A	1 - E	1 - B	1 - B	1 - B	1 - A	1 - E
1.4 Excessive seepage from Fish Lake	2 - B	2 - B	2 - B	2 - D	2 - E	3 - B	3 - B	3 - B	3 - D	3 - E	1 - B	1 - B	1 - A	1 - C	1 - C	3 - B	3 - B	3 - C	3 - D	3 - E	2 - B	2 - B	2 - B	2 - D	2 - E
1.5 Excessive seepage from deep aquifer	1 - A	1 - A	1 - A	1 - A	1 - C	3 - A	3 - A	3 - A	3 - A	3 - D	2 - A	2 - A	2 - A	2 - A	2 - C	3 - A	3 - A	3 - A	3 - A	3 - D	1 - A	1 - A	1 - A	1 - A	1 - C
1.6 Inter-ramp pit wall failure (localized)	4 - B	4 - A	4 - A	4 - A	4 - B	3 - B	3 - A	3 - A	3 - A	3 - B	4 - B	4 - A	4 - A	4 - A	4 - B	3 - B	3 - A	3 - A	3 - A	3 - B	4 - B	4 - A	4 - A	4 - A	4 - B
1.7 Vertical depressurization pump failure	3 - A	3 - A	3 - A	3 - A	3 - C	3 - A	3 - A	3 - A	3 - A	3 - C	3 - A	3 - A	3 - A	3 - A	3 - C	3 - A	3 - A	3 - A	3 - A	3 - C	3 - A	3 - A	3 - A	3 - A	3 - C
1.8 Pit sump pump (and backup) failure	2 - A	2 - A	2 - A	2 - A	2 - B	3 - A	3 - A	3 - A	3 - A	3 - B	3 - A	3 - A	3 - A	3 - A	3 - B	3 - A	3 - A	3 - A	3 - A	3 - B	2 - A	2 - A	2 - A	2 - A	2 - B
2. Tailings Storage Facility																									
2.1 Seepage through main embankment	1 - A	1 - C	1 - C	1 - C	1 - B	1 - A	1 - C	1 - C	1 - C	1 - B	1 - A	1 - B	1 - B	1 - B	1 - B	1 - A	1 - C	1 - C	1 - C	1 - B	1 - A	1 - C	1 - C	1 - C	1 - B
2.2 Seepage through saddle embankment(s)	1 - A	1 - C	1 - B	1 - A	1 - B	1 - A	1 - C	1 - B	1 - A	1 - B	2 - A	2 - D	2 - D	2 - C	2 - C	2 - A	2 - D	2 - B	2 - A	2 - C	2 - A	2 - D	2 - B	2 - A	2 - C
2.3 Seepage through foundations	1 - A	1 - C	1 - C	1 - C	1 - C	2 - A	2 - C	2 - C	2 - C	2 - C	2 - A	2 - B	2 - B	2 - B	2 - C	3 - A	3 - C	3 - C	3 - C	3 - C	3 - A	3 - C	3 - C	3 - C	3 - C
2.4 Internal erosion (piping)	1 - A	1 - D	1 - C	1 - B	1 - E	1 - A	1 - D	1 - C	1 - B	1 - E	1 - B	1 - C	1 - C	1 - B	1 - E	1 - C	1 - D	1 - C	1 - B	1 - E	1 - C	1 - D	1 - C	1 - B	1 - E
2.5 Overtopping of embankment (spillway failu	1 - A	1 - D	1 - D	1 - C	1 - E	1 - A	1 - D	1 - D	1 - C	1 - E	1 - B	1 - C	1 - C	1 - B	1 - E	1 - C	1 - E	1 - D	1 - C	1 - E	1 - C	1 - E	1 - D	1 - C	1 - E
2.6 Embankment instability	2 - A	2 - E	2 - E	2 - D	2 - E	2 - A	2 - E	2 - E	2 - D	2 - E	1 - B	1 - C	1 - C	1 - C	1 - E	2 - C	2 - E	2 - E	2 - D	2 - E	2 - C	2 - E	2 - E	2 - D	2 - E
2.7 Insufficient PAG waste rock submergence	4 - A	4 - D	4 - D	4 - B	4 - C	3 - A	3 - D	3 - D	3 - B	3 - C	3 - A	3 - B	3 - B	3 - B	3 - C	3 - A	3 - C	3 - D	3 - B	3 - C	4 - A	4 - C	4 - D	4 - B	4 - C
2.8 Seepage collection / recycle system failure	1 - A	1 - D	1 - D	1 - B	1 - B	1 - A	1 - D	1 - D	1 - B	1 - B	2 - A	2 - B	2 - B	2 - B	2 - B	2 - A	2 - C	2 - D	2 - C	2 - B	2 - A	2 - C	2 - D	2 - C	2 - B
2.9 Excessive sedimentation during construction	4 - A	4 - E	4 - E	4 - C	4 - B	4 - A	4 - E	4 - E	4 - C	4 - B	2 - A	2 - D	2 - D	2 - C	2 - B	4 - A	4 - E	4 - E	4 - C	4 - B	4 - A	4 - E	4 - E	4 - C	4 - B
2.10 Excessive sedimentation during operations	2 - A	2 - E	2 - E	2 - C	2 - C	2 - A	2 - E	2 - E	2 - C	2 - C	1 - A	1 - D	1 - D	1 - C	1 - B	2 - A	2 - E	2 - E	2 - C	2 - C	2 - A	2 - E	2 - E	2 - C	2 - C
2.11 Release of ARD from PAG - outside TSF	2 - A	2 - C	2 - C	2 - B	2 - B	2 - A	2 - C	2 - C	2 - B	2 - B	1 - A	1 - B	1 - B	1 - B	1 - B	2 - A	2 - C	2 - C	2 - B	2 - B	2 - A	2 - C	2 - C	2 - B	2 - B
3. Waste Rock Storage Areas (WRSA)																									
3.1 Instability	3 - B	3 - C	3 - C	3 - D	3 - D	3 - B	3 - C	3 - C	3 - D	3 - D	2 - B	2 - B	2 - B	2 - C	2 - C	3 - B	3 - C	3 - C	3 - C	3 - D	3 - B	3 - C	3 - C	3 - D	3 - D
3.2 Improper sorting in pit (PAG to WRSA)	3 - A	3 - C	3 - D	3 - C	3 - C	3 - A	3 - C	3 - D	3 - C	3 - C	3 - A	3 - B	3 - C	3 - C	3 - B	3 - A	3 - C	3 - D	3 - C	3 - C	3 - A	3 - C	3 - D	3 - C	3 - C
3.3 Excessive sedimentation during construction	4 - A	4 - E	4 - E	4 - B	4 - B	4 - A	4 - E	4 - E	4 - B	4 - B	2 - A	2 - C	2 - C	2 - B	2 - B	4 - A	4 - E	4 - E	4 - A	4 - B	4 - A	4 - E	4 - E	4 - B	4 - B
3.4 Excessive sedimentation during operations	2 - A	2 - D	2 - E	2 - C	2 - C	2 - A	2 - D	2 - E	2 - C	2 - C	1 - A	1 - C	1 - D	1 - C	1 - B	2 - A	2 - D	2 - E	2 - B	2 - C	2 - A	2 - D	2 - E	2 - C	2 - C
3.5 Release of ARD from PAG - outside WRSA	2 - A	2 - E	2 - E	2 - D	2 - D	2 - A	2 - E	2 - E	2 - D	2 - D	2 - A	2 - D	2 - D	2 - C	2 - C	2 - A	2 - E	2 - E	2 - D	2 - D	2 - A	2 - E	2 - E	2 - D	2 - D
4. Fisheries Compensation Facilities																									
4.1 Failure of diversions (insufficient flows)	4 - A	4 - B	4 - D	4 - B	4 - A	4 - A	4 - B	4 - D	4 - B	4 - A	3 - A	3 - A	3 - D	3 - B	3 - A	4 - A	4 - A	4 - D	4 - B	4 - A	4 - A	4 - A	4 - D	4 - B	4 - A
4.2 Excessive flows (PMF)	2 - A	2 - D	2 - C	2 - B	2 - C	2 - A	2 - D	2 - C	2 - B	2 - C	3 - A	3 - C	3 - C	3 - B	3 - C	2 - A	2 - C	2 - C	2 - B	2 - C	2 - A	2 - C	2 - C	2 - B	2 - C
4.3 Icing of channels or habitat areas	4 - A	4 - A	4 - D	4 - B	4 - C	4 - A	4 - A	4 - D	4 - B	4 - C	3 - A	3 - A	3 - D	3 - B	3 - C	3 - A	3 - A	3 - D	3 - B	3 - C	3 - A	3 - A	3 - D	3 - B	3 - C
4.4 Dam instability	2 - A	2 - D	2 - E	2 - B	2 - C	2 - A	2 - D	2 - E	2 - B	2 - C	2 - A	2 - C	2 - D	2 - B	2 - C	2 - A	2 - C	2 - E	2 - B	2 - D	2 - A	2 - C	2 - E	2 - B	2 - D
4.5 Excessive sedimentation during construction	5 - A	5 - D	5 - D	5 - B	5 - B	5 - A	5 - D	5 - D	5 - B	5 - B	4 - A	4 - D	4 - D	4 - B	4 - B	5 - A	5 - E	5 - E	5 - B	5 - B	5 - A	5 - E	5 - E	5 - B	5 - B
4.6 Excessive sedimentation during operations	1 - A	1 - C	1 - D	1 - B	1 - C	1 - A	1 - C	1 - D	1 - B	1 - C	2 - A	2 - C	2 - D	2 - B	2 - C	1 - A	1 - D	1 - E	1 - B	1 - D	1 - A	1 - D	1 - E	1 - B	1 - D
5. Water and Tailings Management / Distribution																									
5.1 Water pipeline rupture	4 - A	4 - C	4 - C	4 - C	4 - E	4 - A	4 - C	4 - C	4 - C	4 - E	2 - A	2 - B	2 - B	2 - B	2 - D	3 - A	3 - C	3 - B	3 - B	3 - E	3 - A	3 - C	3 - B	3 - B	3 - E
5.2 Water pump station failure	5 - A	5 - C	5 - C	5 - C	5 - E	5 - A	5 - C	5 - C	5 - C	5 - E	3 - A	3 - B	3 - B	3 - B	3 - D	4 - A	4 - C	4 - B	4 - B	4 - E	4 - A	4 - C	4 - B	4 - B	4 - E
5.3 Tailings pipeline rupture	4 - A	4 - E	4 - D	4 - D	4 - E	4 - A	4 - E	4 - D	4 - D	4 - E	2 - A	2 - C	2 - C	2 - C	2 - D	3 - A	3 - E	3 - D	3 - D	3 - E	3 - A	3 - E	3 - D	3 - D	3 - E
5.4 Tailings pump station failure	5 - A	5 - D	5 - C	5 - C	5 - E	5 - A	5 - D	5 - C	5 - C	5 - E	3 - A	3 - C	3 - C	3 - B	3 - D	4 - A	4 - D	4 - D	4 - C	4 - E	4 - A	4 - D	4 - D	4 - C	4 - E
5.5 Tailings distribution failure - poor pond loc	3 - A	3 - B	3 - B	3 - B	3 - C	2 - A	2 - B	2 - B	2 - B	2 - C	2 - A	2 - B	2 - B	2 - B	2 - C	2 - A	2 - C	2 - B	2 - B	2 - D	3 - A	3 - C	3 - B	3 - B	3 - D
5.6 Excessive make-up water requirements	2 - A	2 - B	2 - B	2 - B	2 - C	3 - A	3 - B	3 - B	3 - B	3 - C	3 - A	3 - B	3 - B	3 - B	3 - C	3 - A	3 - B	3 - B	3 - B	3 - C	2 - A	2 - B	2 - B	2 - B	2 - C
6. Mill Site																									
6.1 Reagent / chemical spills	2 - A	2 - B	2 - B	2 - C	2 - B	2 - A	2 - B	2 - B	2 - C	2 - B	2 - A	2 - B	2 - B	2 - C	2 - B	2 - A	2 - B	2 - B	2 - C	2 - B	2 - A	2 - B	2 - B	2 - C	2 - B
6.2 Hydrocarbon spills	2 - A	2 - C	2 - C	2 - E	2 - B	2 - A	2 - C	2 - C	2 - E	2 - B	2 - A	2 - B	2 - B	2 - D	2 - B	2 - A	2 - C	2 - C	2 - D	2 - B	2 - A	2 - C	2 - C	2 - E	2 - B

TASEKO MINES LIMITED

PROSPERITY PROJECT

TABLE 13

PROJECT RISK ASSESSMENT

SUMMARY OF ABSOLUTE RANKINGS

BY CONSEQUENCE TYPE AND BY MINE COMPONENT (A+ TO B- SCALE)

BY CONSEQUENCE TYPE (ABSOLUTE RATINGS):					
	Option I	**Option II**	**Option III**	**Option IV**	**Option V**
Human Life	A+	A+	A+	A	A+
Water Quality	B	B-	A-	B-	B
Fisheries	B-	B-	A-	B-	B-
Wildlife / Biophysical	B+	B+	A	B+	B+
Operations	B-	B-	B+	B-	B-
OVERALL	**B+**	**B**	**A-**	**B**	**B**

BY MINE COMPONENT (ABSOLUTE RATINGS):					
	Option I	**Option II**	**Option III**	**Option IV**	**Option V**
Open Pit	A+	A	A+	A	A+
Tailings Storage Facility	A	A	A+	A-	A-
Waste Rock Storage Area	B	B	A	B	B
Fisheries Compensation	B+	B+	B+	B+	B+
Water and Tailings Mangement	B-	B-	A-	B	B
Mill Site	A	A	A+	A	A
OVERALL	**A-**	**B+**	**A**	**A-**	**A-**